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Where Next for Social Protection?*
Stephen Devereux, Keetie Roelen and Martina Ulrichs
Abstract The rapid ascendancy of social protection up the development 
policy agenda raises questions about whether its current prominence will 
be sustained, or whether it will turn out to be just another development 
fad. What trajectory will social protection follow, which actors will drive it 
forward and what will be the main issues and challenges? This article reports 
on a small foresight study designed to address the question: ‘Where next 
for social protection?’ A scenario-building exercise revealed that there is no 
single linear pathway for social protection, but multiple highly context-specific 
trajectories subject to change as political ideologies and institutional capacities 
shift. A ‘wind-tunnelling’ exercise highlighted the importance of a country’s 
political regime as a fundamental determinant of which social protection 
policies will be adopted. Better understanding of political processes is needed 
to protect gains made in social protection against possible reversals when the 
political climate shifts against pro-poor redistributive policies.
Keywords: drivers of  change, foresight, rights-based approaches, 
scenario-building, social protection, wind-tunnelling.
1 Introduction
Social protection is incontrovertibly one of  the success stories of  
development policy in the early twenty-first century. Every year new 
social protection programmes are launched, more countries adopt 
a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) or Strategy (NSPS), and 
evaluations generate further empirical evidence of  positive impacts. 
Current trends in social protection thinking and practice are taking 
two potentially contradictory directions – crudely, ‘rights-based’ versus 
‘growth-oriented’ – which have different implications for who should 
receive what types of  support, under what conditions and for how long.
1 Rights-based: institutionalising social protection in national policy 
frameworks, underpinned by legislation that endows justiciable 
claims to social protection entitlements to all citizens or residents, 
including refugees;
2 Growth-oriented: using social protection instrumentally, as a toolkit 
for achieving poverty reduction and economic growth; for example, 
by ‘exiting’ participants out of  programmes when they reach a 
‘graduation’ threshold.
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The trajectory of  social protection as a policy discourse deserves scrutiny. 
Although ‘social safety nets’ were introduced as a response to economic crises 
in the 1980s or earlier, the broader concept of  social protection originated in 
the late 1990s. It was encapsulated first in the World Bank’s growth-oriented 
‘Social Risk Management’ framework (World Bank 2001), and later advanced 
by rights-based frameworks such as the Institute of  Development Studies’ 
(IDS) ‘Transformative Social Protection’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
2004) and the International Labour Organization’s ‘Social Protection Floor’ 
(ILO 2011). In the mid-2000s the analysis shifted to specific design issues 
(e.g. targeting, dependency syndrome) and efforts to build the evidence 
base on impacts of  specific instruments (e.g. conditional cash transfers, 
school feeding). In the 2010s the focus has moved on to establishing social 
protection as a policy sector within government ministries and to challenges 
of  coordination and systematisation (e.g. building a ‘single registry’).
Since the introduction of  social safety nets in the 1980s, social 
protection has expanded greatly as a component of  social policy. 
Common indicators used to measure this growth include the number 
of  social protection policies in place, the percentage of  the population 
covered by such policies and the proportion of  public expenditures 
allocated to social protection (ILO 2014). The ‘Social Protection Index’ 
(ADB 2013) captures both the ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ of  social protection 
coverage, measured by the number of  beneficiaries and the level of  
benefits provided by social protection programmes.
This crude trajectory raises an obvious question: where next for social 
protection? We identify three broad potential scenarios: (a) expansion; 
(b) plateau; (c) decline.
Figure 1 Potential trajectories of social protection
2000 2015 2025
(a) Expansion  
Social protection continues to grow 
both conceptually and operationally, 
generating interesting new issues to 
research, new policies to design and new 
programmes to evaluate.
(b) Plateau  
Social protection becomes entrenched 
as a permanent fixture of development 
discourse, consolidating its place in 
government and donor policy and 
steadily increasing its coverage.
(c) Decline  
Social protection becomes just another 
development fashion that follows a 
conventional project cycle, peaking 
around 2015 but declining thereafter, 
just as rapidly as it rose.
Source Authors’ own.
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Against this backdrop, we undertook a small-scale foresight project that 
aimed to:
1 critically review the policy discourse on social protection since its 
origins in the late 1990s and how it has been shaped by the main 
influencing actors;
2 identify and explore themes that are likely to be high on the social 
protection agenda in the short to medium term;
3 identify drivers of  change that are likely to shape the social 
protection landscape in the medium to long term and to develop 
and test future scenarios for social protection;
4 identify entry points for responding to future themes, challenges 
and opportunities that will shape the future of  social protection and 
determine appropriate forms of  ongoing engagement.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodologies 
used for each component of  the research. Section 3 explores the ‘drivers 
of  change’ likely to affect social protection in the coming period, under the 
five ‘STEEP’ categories: social, technological, economic, environmental 
and political. Section 4 unpacks expected trajectories of  social protection by 
considering the main issues and debates that might affect which trajectory 
is actually followed. Section 5 looks forward by describing potential future 
scenarios and policy options for social protection in the next 10 to 15 years, 
drawing on the foresight methodology. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methods
An eclectic mix of  methods was designed and implemented, which 
included a background literature review; structured one-on-one 
interviews with key informants active in social protection policymaking, 
conceptualisation or research; a moderated online discussion event that 
engaged a wider audience working on social protection across the world; 
and two face-to-face foresight workshops.
The Centre for Social Protection (CSP), with the support of  Knowledge 
Services at IDS and Elliptics Ltd, facilitated an online discussion event 
on the topic ‘Where Next for Social Protection?’, which ran for four 
days in September 2014. The discussion was structured around four 
questions, one for each day.
 l Day 1 – Predicting the future: Do you think that social protection 
will become more or less prominent in the development policy 
agenda in the next five to ten years? Why?
 l Day 2 – Issues and debates: What will be the most important issues 
and debates in social protection in the next five to ten years?
 l Day 3 – Drivers of  change: What will be the most important drivers 
of  change affecting social protection in the next five to ten years?
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 l Day 4 – The way forward: What needs to be done, and by which 
actors, to ensure that social protection remains high on the 
development policy agenda in the coming five to ten years? What 
can we do?
More than 200 participants registered for the online discussion from 
all over the world. Just over half  of  the participants came from or were 
based in Africa, Asia or Latin America, while just under half  came from 
Europe (including the UK) or North America. Altogether 138 postings 
were made at an average of  34 postings each day.
Two foresight workshops were hosted by the Centre for Social 
Protection at IDS, in September and November 2014. The workshops 
brought together 18 people who work intensively on social protection, 
from research institutes, donors and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Three forecasting methods were used in the workshops: drivers 
of  change analysis, scenario building and wind-tunnelling.
Drivers of  change analysis: Workshop participants brainstormed 
around the driving forces in the broader contextual environment that 
are likely to influence the direction of  social protection programming 
over the next 10 to 15 years, under five ‘STEEP’ categories – social 
(demographics, lifestyles, social trends, etc.); technology (ICTs, media, 
etc.); economy (economic policies, growth rates); environment (climate 
change, natural resource management), and politics (welfare regimes, 
development policies and international aid flows).
Scenario building: Workshop participants selected two of  the most 
powerful drivers identified in the ‘drivers of  change’ exercise, and 
constructed four scenario ‘spaces’, using one driver as an x-axis and 
the other driver as a y-axis to create four quadrants. These scenarios 
were developed into narratives by reflecting on what kind of  world each 
quadrant would represent, and the implications of  that possible future 
world for social protection programming.
Wind-tunnelling: Next, the participants proposed several possible social 
protection policies to be introduced into the scenarios, and discussed 
how effectively each policy would perform given the contextual situation 
described for each scenario. The purpose was to identify what is possible 
in terms of  robust social protection measures under different possible 
future conditions in specific country contexts.
3 Drivers of change
Drivers of  change were considered in five categories: social, 
technological, economic, environmental and political (STEEP). These 
drivers were identified and assessed using all methods in this project. 
Findings from the literature review point towards historical drivers 
of  the current state of  social protection, while findings from the key 
informant interviews, online discussion and foresight workshops 
consider drivers that are deemed likely to play important roles in 
shaping the future world in which social protection will operate. 
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A number of  social factors emerged across all different methods 
of  investigation in this project, including increasing inequality, 
demographic shifts and urbanisation.
Rising inequality has incentivised governments, particularly in middle-
income countries, to introduce social protection as a redistributive 
mechanism. Various key informants pointed towards the potentially 
dangerous social impacts of  inequality and the role for social protection 
as a palliative mechanism that can enhance social cohesion. In 
contexts with high levels of  income inequality, social protection is more 
affordable since there is usually a larger tax-base to finance it with 
domestic resources (Hickey 2008), while in contexts with high levels of  
social inequality the associated political volatility has triggered increased 
investment in social protection. So income and social inequalities have 
consequences on both the supply- and demand-side.
Demographic shifts will transform the composition of  societies. Some 
countries will be confronted with a ‘population dividend’ provided by 
a large percentage of  young people, while others are already foreseeing 
an increasing need for pensions due to a growing proportion of  older 
people. Will a higher demand for social protection for particular groups 
of  society translate into more and better-quality supply? During the 
online discussion, some thought that the key question is whether population 
ageing stimulates the expansion of  social protection – and especially pensions – or 
will ultimately lead to its unaffordability (or both).
Higher levels of  urbanisation also increase the need for social 
protection since rural–urban migration often disrupts traditional (rural) 
safety nets. Social protection has traditionally focused on the rural poor 
and has developed instruments which address particular vulnerability 
profiles. However, the types of  vulnerabilities change when people move 
from rural to urban areas, as increasing numbers of  poor people are 
doing, and lose their community-based safety nets and social capital in 
the transition from rural livelihoods to mostly informal paid work.
Urbanisation not only increases the need for formal social protection 
to reduce vulnerability among the labour force, but also increases the 
demand for social protection by ‘urban citizens’ who are more likely 
to mobilise and lobby for their rights. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012) argue 
that the higher levels of  urbanisation in middle-income countries 
have played a role in determining the socialisation of  formal social 
protection, in comparison to low-income countries. Labour market 
structures in urban areas are still characterised by high levels of  
informality, mobile workers and gaps in the provision of  social security 
for the poorest. This does not only affect migrants from rural areas 
but also international migrants, particularly as eligibility for social 
protection is often tied to citizenship status. This raises the question of  
how social protection will have to change to fill these gaps and address 
the new sets of  emerging vulnerabilities.
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Technological factors were not considered to be greatly important in 
shaping the future landscape for social protection, other than in the 
delivery of  social transfers (World Bank 2012). However, two additional 
technological factors were considered in the workshops. Firstly, the 
role of  technology in changing skills requirements in labour markets, 
shifting demand for labour even further towards high-skilled labour, 
may have implications for the demand for social protection, particularly 
for low-skilled workers. Secondly, the rapid increase in the use of  social 
media may allow for greater civil society mobilisation and organisation, 
thereby generating greater demand for social protection.
In terms of  economic factors, issues regarding economic growth 
and economic volatility were discussed in the online discussion and 
key informant interviews. High levels of  economic growth in many 
developing countries and the reclassification of  low-income as middle-
income countries, gave rise to the question as to whether the demand 
for social protection will expand among the growing middle classes. 
A strong focus on economic growth as a development objective is also 
increasing the pressure on social protection to demonstrate positive 
impacts on inequality, productivity and growth (World Bank 2012). 
This could increase political support for social protection, but could 
also divert attention from its main objective – to protect people against 
risks and reduce vulnerability (de Haan 2014). Several key informants 
emphasised the importance of  reconciling the objectives of  economic 
growth and reducing inequality and the role of  social protection in such 
inclusive pro-poor growth.
Recent financial crises and economic volatility were referred to many 
times as suggesting a greater need for social protection. The financial 
crisis in 1997–8 in Southeast Asia acted as a wake-up call regarding 
the inadequacy of  existing social safety nets and proved an important 
milestone in the region’s development of  social protection (Cook 2009). 
Nonetheless, it was pointed out that recent crises have not yet raised 
enough awareness about the need for social protection. Further 
economic factors identified in the workshops include the changing levels 
and characteristics of  poverty, increasing flexibilisation of  labour markets 
and shifts in private versus public service provision, including a potential 
for more public–private partnerships in the delivery of  social protection.
Environmental drivers of  change were identified in relation to climate 
change and revenue from natural resources. Poor people in rural 
areas whose livelihoods depend on natural resources are likely to be 
impacted negatively by changes in the natural environment. The 
consequences of  climate change, including recurring disasters, as well 
as the unpredictability of  the weather and consequently agricultural 
productivity, are increasing the need for social protection to mitigate 
livelihood risks (ESCAP 2011). Many online discussants and key 
informants pointed towards the role of  social protection in making 
people more resilient to climate shocks by supporting them to adapt 
their livelihoods. Notwithstanding the importance that climate change 
(Endnotes)
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will play in shaping the world in 10 to 15 years’ time, this is an area 
where opinion is sharply divided, with one view being that climate 
change will continue to rise up the agenda and that social protection 
offers an appropriate response, and an opposing view being that social 
protection has only a marginal role in addressing the fundamental 
challenges to livelihoods that climate change poses.
Political drivers were considered crucial in shaping the future world that 
social protection will be part of  and to which it will need to respond. 
These drivers were identified as operating at different levels and include 
global development paradigms, political realities in donor countries 
and political commitment at national level. Inequality is widely seen 
as a major force that could drive a rationale for social protection and 
create a political incentive within the global development paradigm. 
Reducing inequality – encompassing income inequality and inequalities 
along socio-demographic characteristics – is also a ‘hot topic’ in current 
development debates, and social protection is often mentioned as one of  
the main policy instruments to achieve this.
How this will happen is still unclear and it could go in different 
directions: will growing inequalities cause greater social schisms and 
the development of  parallel systems (comfortable social security for 
the better off, and meagre poor relief  for the poor), or will they fuel 
demands for more universal and redistributive social protection systems? 
At the regional level in Africa, for example, the African Progress Panel 
and the African Development Bank are emphasising the need for 
governments to step up their investments in health, education and social 
protection, with a view to moving towards universal access to these basic 
social services. Consolidating regional integration and harmonising 
social security will help to address challenges posed to social security 
systems, for example by migrant workers.
This leads into a second political driver, namely the political reality in 
donor countries, or influential countries that have a strong impact on 
policy in developing countries. ‘Chindia’ was coined as a term during 
the workshops to denote the expanding and increasingly important 
role of  China and India in developing countries. Whether the political 
climate in countries that are driving social protection as a global 
development policy agenda is ‘progressive’ (rights-based) or ‘regressive’ 
(austerity-driven), has profound implications for levels of  financing and 
the nature of  technical support offered. While progressive agendas may 
be supportive of  more universal and redistributive systems that are 
embedded in legal frameworks, regressive policies are more likely to 
focus on maintaining the status quo and providing only discretionary 
support to those in absolute need.
While international agreements, UN conventions and donor agendas 
can put social protection into the limelight and provide the tools for 
establishing social protection systems, whether this translates into action 
will ultimately depend on political commitment at the national level. 
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What determines such political commitment will be context-specific. 
Democratic processes and the ability of  society to organise itself  and 
influence welfare policies are thought to be essential. At the same time, 
countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, China and Vietnam may not fit 
such a characterisation of  their political contexts but have seen strong 
commitment to and expansion of  social protection. National ownership 
of  social protection programmes is emerging unanimously as a 
necessary pre-condition for the sustainability of  programmes, and forms 
a strong pillar of  social protection strategies.
Yet, how and why governments decide on committing to social 
protection is highly context-specific. Frequently, the popularity of  social 
protection is explained along social-democratic (or Polanyian) lines – 
growing inequalities and vulnerabilities trigger expansions of  public 
policies. There is, however, no direct causality between increasing needs 
(demand) and increasing delivery of  social protection (supply), since 
it leaves the political drivers of  social policies out of  the equation (de 
Haan 2014). Public and political opinions on social provisioning and the 
role of  the state are deeply ideologically motivated.
In some regions, political commitment will derive from a determination 
to uphold the rights of  citizens. Nevertheless, it may also be strongly 
influenced by immediate political pressures, particularly in electoral 
democracies, or by longer-term considerations if  social stability is seen 
as critical to political legitimacy (ESCAP 2011; Cecchini and Martínez 
2012). In other contexts where social protection is externally financed, 
policy processes and sources of  financing are still detached. Evidence is 
Figure 2 Scenarios
Source Authors’ own.
High institutional capacity‘All dressed up but 
nowhere to go’
Regressive local politics, 
progressive politics in 
influential countries
Regressive local politics, 
regressive politics in 
influential countries
Regressive local politics, 
progressive politics in 
influential countries
Regressive local 
politics, regressive 
politics in influential 
countries
Progressive local 
politics, regressive 
politics in influential 
countries
Progressive local 
politics, progressive 
politics in influential 
countries
‘Oh dear’
‘The spirit is 
willing but the 
body is weak’
‘Utopia’
Low institutional capacity
1b
3b
2b
2a 1a
3a
X
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built around ‘what works’ rather than on what kind of  evidence will be 
credible and useful to influence national policy processes (Devereux and 
White 2010; Gentilini and Omamo 2011).
This ties into a final driver that was discussed extensively during 
the workshops, namely that of  institutional capacity. What levels of  
financial, human and technical resources do countries have (or are 
willing to dedicate) for social protection programmes, and do they have 
institutions strong enough to deliver them effectively?
4 Future scenarios
4.1 Scenario building
Following the identification of  drivers of  change likely to shape the 
world in which social protection operates, two drivers were selected to 
underpin the ‘scenario-building’ exercise: ‘progressive/regressive politics’ 
and ‘high/low national institutional capacity’. These were subsequently 
placed on a continuum on an x-axis and y-axis respectively, such that four 
potential scenarios emerged (corresponding to the quadrants in Figure 2):
 l ‘Utopia’ (top right): progressive politics, high capacity
 l ‘The spirit is willing but the body is weak’ (bottom right): progressive 
politics, low capacity
 l ‘All dressed up but nowhere to go’ (top left) regressive politics, high 
capacity
 l ‘Oh dear’ (bottom left): regressive politics, low capacity.
It was decided that the ‘ideal’ scenario (top right – ‘Utopia’) would not 
be discussed as it was considered to be the least interesting scenario for 
further exploration, and least likely to occur in low-income countries 
where social protection is currently being introduced or expanded.
In the process of  scenario building, however, it became evident that 
the driver on ‘politics’ was not specific enough and conflated political 
processes at two different levels: (1) national or local level and (2) global 
or ‘influential countries’ level, where influential countries are those 
dominating the design and financing of  social protection programmes 
in low-income countries. Sub-dividing the politics driver to account for 
this bifurcation resulted in the emergence of  six scenarios for further 
exploration.
To keep the analysis manageable, it was decided to choose one slice – 
(a) or (b) – of  each quadrant, and in order to maximise diversity, the 
following scenarios were chosen for further elaboration: Scenario 1a: 
‘The spirit is willing…’; Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’; and Scenario 3b: ‘All 
dressed up…’.
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ (progressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, low institutional capacity). In this 
scenario there exists goodwill and good intentions, both domestically 
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and internationally, but limited capacity to deliver social protection and 
other services effectively. Factors that might hold back progress in this 
scenario include: high or rising civil insecurity, food price and climate-
related shocks, a youthful population with low skills, the dominance of  
the private sector over societal interests, and rising social frustrations 
about government failures leading to service delivery protests.
Positive features of  this scenario include: an alignment of  national 
governments and donors and development partners around what needs 
to be done, high aid flows with a particular emphasis on strengthening 
institutional capacity and technical expertise, an active civil society 
which could be strengthened and rights-based policies – at least on 
paper. There is potential for technology to help tackle or bypass 
delivery challenges. There is a risk of  donor dependence or that social 
experiments will be trialled as pilot projects. Social protection initiatives 
that are launched in this context might be unsustainable because 
they rely heavily on expatriate financial and technical inputs, and 
government lacks the capacity to take over their management and scale 
them up.
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ (regressive local politics, progressive 
international politics, low institutional capacity). This scenario is 
characterised by high levels of  poverty and inequality. Citizens have no 
voice and civil society is weak or repressed, so government is effectively 
unaccountable. Civil society exists mainly as implementing partners for 
development projects of  international donors, rather than as activists 
campaigning for change. Government has no interest in rights-based 
approaches, clientelism is rife, public provision of  services is weak, 
the middle classes depend on private social services, and there is low 
commitment by public officials to help the poor.
Apart from the dire political situation, the economic situation is 
equally challenging. Labour markets are insecure with a large informal 
sector and unregulated markets; there is little social protection against 
livelihood shocks such as extreme weather events, price shocks and 
financial crises; people face multiple vulnerabilities, such as high health 
risks and low health outcomes. Because of  these political and economic 
challenges, there is extensive ‘economic’ migration within and between 
countries, including unplanned and poorly serviced urban informal 
settlement, as well as ‘political’ migration inside and beyond national 
boundaries (population displacement, refugees). International actors 
have a limited role, which is often restricted to humanitarian relief.
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ (regressive local politics, regressive 
international politics, high institutional capacity). Because politics in this 
scenario are regressive both locally and internationally, external relations 
are dominated by ‘trade, not aid’ – international trade agreements rather 
than aid flows. The labour market is stagnant and unemployment is 
high. There is inadequate state regulation of  private sector employers. 
This is a low-wage economy dominated by informalisation. Societal 
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expectations and ambitions are low. Those who can, migrate to more 
vibrant economies in more progressive countries elsewhere.
Because local capacity is relatively high, financing for social protection 
is generated by economic growth and a mix of  public and private 
provision. However, only a minimal safety net is installed, to quell 
social unrest. Public expenditure is rolled back and public sector 
budgets are cut for ideological reasons. Social insurance is based on 
private contributions while social assistance comes with conditionalities 
attached. This leads to rising inequality and polarisation, with limited 
redistribution of  public resources and few groups being adequately 
covered by government-run social protection programmes.
5 Wind-tunnelling
The wind-tunnelling exercise aimed to formulate policy options 
for social protection within these three scenarios. The focus was on 
identifying viable and feasible options in the three different ‘future 
worlds’. Policy options formulated for one scenario were subsequently 
‘tested’ against the other scenarios to assess their feasibility and 
opportunities for application in radically different contexts. Discussions 
on the basis of  this exercise are summarised here.
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ Proposed policy options 
included: building consensus on a single national vision and platform 
for social protection; using technical assistance in innovative ways to 
strengthen local capacity; signing up to the Social Protection Floor and 
adopting a ‘progressive realisation’ approach to achieving it, increasing 
public demand for social services, including accountability mechanisms 
such as grievance procedures, and introducing right-to-work schemes 
(employment guarantees rather than public works projects). All of  these 
proposals were agreed to be appropriate in a context of  progressive 
local and international political regimes but low institutional capacity.
These proposals received mixed reactions from Scenarios 2a and 3b. 
There was little enthusiasm for a national vision and no interest at all 
in signing up to the Social Protection Floor, which was dismissed as 
‘too progressive’. Public services would be delivered alongside private 
providers and there would definitely be no accountability mechanisms. 
The ‘right-to-work’ proposal was rejected in favour of  old-style public 
works: ‘No right to work, but a duty to work’.
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ Proposed policy options were very limited and 
unambitious, reflecting the limited commitment and accountability of  
this regressive regime and its low capacity to deliver public services. 
Social protection would effectively take its most basic ‘safety net’ 
forms: humanitarian response during crises (probably delivered by 
international agencies rather than the government), public works 
projects (also externally funded and run by donors or NGOs), mother 
and child feeding schemes, and contributory pensions for civil servants 
as part of  the government’s clientelist orientation.
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The regressive government of  Scenario 3b endorsed these suggestions, 
as both regimes share a common ideology. But since Scenario 3b has 
higher capacity to deliver services, the government would be the main 
implementing agency for all interventions. The progressive government 
of  Scenario 1a did not oppose these ideas in principle, but would 
implement them as part of  a coordinated national vision for social 
protection rather than as isolated projects. Contributory pensions for 
civil servants would only be acceptable as one component of  a universal 
pension scheme.
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ Policy options in this scenario 
were highly regressive. The regime is assumed to be pro-business 
so deregulation of  business is favoured, implying low social security 
coverage and contributions, and no minimum wage to protect low-paid 
workers against exploitation. Social protection will be dominated by 
conditionalities and a focus on graduating people off programmes and 
into the labour market as quickly as possible. Minimal social assistance 
will take the form of  food banks that will be run by the non-profit third 
sector plus private partnerships.
The equally regressive government of  Scenario 2a supported these 
proposals in principle, but noted that international donor partners 
might not endorse excessive deregulation of  the private sector and 
restricted social security protections for workers. They might also lack 
the capacity to implement graduation programmes, even while agreeing 
with the intention behind them. The government of  Scenario 1a 
disapproved of  this entire set of  proposals on ideological grounds. 
Favouring business, conditionalities, graduation and soup kitchens are 
all antithetical to the more pro-poor and rights-based orientation of  this 
progressive regime and its progressive international partners.
This exercise revealed that the fundamental determinant of  a country’s 
social protection trajectory is likely to be the nature of  that country’s 
political regime. A progressive government will be open to rights-
based approaches such as the Social Protection Floor and employment 
guarantee schemes, civil society mobilisation and accountability 
mechanisms. Low institutional capacity can be partly rectified with 
the support of  development partners, especially if  the international 
political climate is also progressive. Conversely, regressive governments 
will reject rights-based approaches in favour of  minimalist safety net 
approaches such as food banks, public works projects and limited 
conditional cash transfers. The economic and political contexts will be 
conducive to business and the private sector, and contributory social 
security for formal employees is preferred to large-scale social assistance 
programmes such as social grants.
The exercise further revealed that the role of  the international political 
regime is likely to be limited. While it may be important in creating 
an enabling environment for progressive and innovative policy design 
(through the launch of  global initiatives such as the Social Protection 
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Floor and provision of  technical assistance, for example) or acting as a 
brake on regressive interventions, it is unlikely to form a decisive factor 
in shaping national social protection landscapes.
6 Conclusion
As noted earlier, this is not a conventional study that investigated a 
research question or hypothesis in order to draw out recommendations 
for improved practice from the empirical findings. Instead we used a 
variety of  methods and tools to draw out a range of  views on possible 
future trajectories for social protection as a policy domain in low- and 
middle-income countries, and we have presented these views without 
imposing our own prejudices or a false consensus where none exists.
At the start of  the online discussion event for this project, registered 
participants were asked to vote on whether they believe that social 
protection will grow, stabilise or decline in the next five to ten years. 
Responses were overwhelmingly optimistic. No less than 87 per cent 
(63 of  72 who answered) predicted that social protection will continue 
to grow, 10 per cent thought it will stabilise at its current level, and only 
3 per cent believed that it will start to decline from its present position 
on the development policy agenda.
Key informants interviewed for this project expressed a diversity of  views 
on this question. Many shared the dominant view that social protection 
will continue to rise on national policy agendas, while others predicted 
that social protection will reach a natural plateau fairly soon. A few key 
informants reflected the minority view that social protection will decline, 
especially at the level of  the global development policy discourse.
Reinforcing the pre-discussion vote, the dominant view among the online 
participants, as well as key informants, was that social protection will 
continue to become more prominent on the development agenda in the 
next five to ten years, for both ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ reasons.
On the demand side, social protection will grow because there will be a 
continual increasing need for it. Social protection can help in bridging 
inequality and reducing vulnerability. It can function as a stabilising 
force post-crisis (economic and political) and address social exclusion of  
the poorest. However, the increasing need for social protection should 
not be taken as a sign of  its success, if  it is used instrumentally as a 
‘band-aid’ for failed economic strategies and systemic failure.
On the supply side, social protection is increasingly gaining political 
support. The demand will be met because there is increasing political 
interest in supplying social protection. The last decade has seen an 
exponential growth in the number of  developing countries that are 
introducing social protection programmes. Countries like Brazil and 
Mexico in Latin America, or Rwanda and Ethiopia in Africa, have 
pioneered national social protection programmes that have served as 
models for their regions. Some countries, such as South Africa and India, 
have even integrated legal provisions for social protection into their 
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constitutions. This trend will not only continue, but it will likely move 
towards a more holistic agenda linked to the provision of  basic services, 
such as health and education, as well as to economic sectors such as 
agriculture and job creation. Political will and national ownership remain 
decisive in the evolution of  national social protection systems.
It is never easy to predict the future, but a few projections can be 
made with some degree of  confidence. Social protection will continue 
to consolidate, especially in middle-income countries, where projects 
and programmes will increasingly become components of  integrated 
systems with linkages to other social and economic sectors and 
(where appropriate) harmonised financial and technical support from 
development partners. Challenges of  affordability and extending 
coverage will persist in low-income countries – there might even be 
reversals in unfavourable economic and political contexts.
Economic shocks and political crises, whether at national, regional or 
global level, will continue to either undermine the deepening of  social 
protection systems or will motivate increasing investments in building 
systems to protect people against the consequences of  these shocks – 
this could go either way. Social protection will increasingly become a 
response to income inequality and social inequities rather than being 
driven only by poverty and demographic vulnerabilities. It is not yet 
clear whether rights-based approaches towards universal provision 
underpinned by justiciable legislation, such as the Social Protection 
Floor, will gain traction globally or only in certain countries.
The governance of  social protection will gain increasing attention, 
particularly with respect to such issues as decentralised programming, 
the role of  civil society, and bottom-up social accountability 
mechanisms. Development partners will need to redefine their role, 
probably moving away from financing social protection projects 
directly and building the evidence base on impacts, towards innovative 
approaches to technical support and building national capacities.
Ultimately, the direction that social protection takes will vary from 
country to country and will shift over time, as capacities to deliver 
fluctuate and as governments and political ideologies change. Better 
understanding of  political processes around social protection, and 
innovative approaches to building institutional capacity, are essential to 
consolidate progress and to exploit both ‘progressive’ periods and times 
of  austerity as windows of  opportunity for reshaping social protection, 
as it moves forward into its next phase.
Notes
* This article draws on Devereux, S.; Roelen, K. and Ulrichs, M.
(2015) Where Next for Social Protection?, IDS Evidence Report 124,
Brighton: IDS.
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